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AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY MODELING AND ALERTING ALGORITHM VERIFICATION*

CÉSAR MUÑOZ[†] AND VICTOR CARREÑO[‡]

Abstract. The Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) program at NASA Langley Research Center aims at giving pilots the information necessary to make independent approaches to parallel runways with spacing down to 2500 feet in Instrument Meteorological Conditions. The AILS concept consists of accurate traffic information visible at the navigation display and an alerting algorithm which warns the crew when one of the aircraft involved in a parallel landing is diverting from the intended flight path. In this paper we present a model of aircraft approaches to parallel runways. Based on this model, we analyze the alerting algorithm with the objective of verifying its correctness. The formalization is conducted in the general verification system PVS.

Key words. trajectory modeling, alerting algorithm, formal methods, theorem proving

Subject classification. Computer Science

1. Introduction. The Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) [12, 3, 6] is a project being conducted at NASA Langley Research Center. Its objective is to reduce traffic delays and increase airport efficiency by enabling approaches to closely spaced parallel runways in Instrument Meteorological Conditions.

Approaches to parallel runways are currently limited to 4300 feet in Instrument Meteorological Conditions. Specially equipped airports with fast scan radars, high resolution monitoring systems, and approach-specific air traffic controllers can perform parallel approaches to 3400 feet [14, 8]. The AILS project aims at shifting the responsibility of maintaining separation during parallel approaches from the air traffic controller to the aircraft crew. Via the AILS concept, approaches to parallel runways 2500 feet apart in Instrument Meteorological Conditions are expected.

AILS eliminates the delay inherent in the communication between air traffic controller and crew by displaying parallel traffic information in the cockpit. The degree of safety is enhanced by an alerting system which warns the crew when one of the aircraft involved in a parallel landing is deviating from the intended flight path. The alerting algorithm is a critical part of the AILS concept. Flaws in its logic could lead to non-alerted collision incidents. The algorithm has been extensively tested in simulators and in real flights.

The objective of this work is to conduct a formal analysis of the alerting algorithm in order to discover any possible errors that have not been detected during testing and simulation. In particular, we develop a formal model of parallel landing scenarios. Based on this model, we study the behavior of the AILS algorithm with respect to predictions of collision incidents.

The formalization presented in this paper has been developed in the general verification system PVS [11]. We use a stylized- \LaTeX PVS concrete syntax and assume the reader is familiar with standard notations of higher-order logic.

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TABLE 2.1
Alerting sequence

	Evader	Intruder
1		Localizer alert (one dot deviation)
2		Localizer alert (two dot deviation)
3		Caution alert (traffic)
4	Caution alert (traffic)	
5		Warning alert (collision)
6	Warning alert (collision)	

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the AILS system. Section 3 describes the alerting algorithm and its abstraction in PVS. A formal model of aircraft trajectories is presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains the main properties that have been proven in PVS. Section 6 summarizes our work and suggests future research directions. Finally, the appendix includes our PVS formal model which is electronically available at: <http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/people/vac/ails.pvs>.

2. System Description. In a typical independent parallel approach, aircraft intersect their localizer track (longitudinal runway center) approximately 10 nautical miles from the runway threshold (see Figure 2.1). During localizer intersection, aircraft have a 1000 feet vertical separation. After the aircraft are established in their localizer track, vertical separation is eliminated and aircraft start a normal glide path for landing. If an aircraft deviates from its airspace, the AILS system provides 6 alert levels, depending on the severity of the deviation. Table 2.1 shows an alerting sequence as seen in the evader and intruder aircraft primary and navigation displays.

All alerts in the intruder aircraft are expected to be followed by a corrective maneuver. The evader aircraft is not expected to perform an evasive maneuver until a warning alert is issued, at which time landing is aborted and an emergency escape maneuver is performed. Notice that the intruder aircraft always receives a caution or warning alert before the respective caution or warning alerts are issued to the evader. A parallel runway approach is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Several assumptions were made in the development of the alerting algorithm. These assumptions are justified by physical characteristics and operational constraints. They are as follows:

- Time is discrete and divided in increments of 0.5 seconds. We call this value *tstep*.
- The algorithm is executed every *tstep* seconds.
- The rate of turn is determined by the bank angle and ground speed.
- The speeds of the aircraft are constant. Henceforth, we use *intruderSpeed* and *evaderSpeed* as the constant speed values of the intruder and evader aircraft, respectively.
- The AILS system starts operating when the aircraft are on their localizers. At this time the aircraft are approximately at the same altitude.
- The vertical separation between the aircraft is assumed to be 0 during a landing approach.
- Only the intruder aircraft will deviate from its path in a parallel approach. The evader aircraft stays in its localizer.

It should be noted that the experimental AILS system, as currently designed, forms part of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [13]. In this work, we assume that the AILS alerting algorithm is running in isolation from other aircraft components. In addition, we concentrate on the caution and




FIG. 2.1. *Parallel runway approach*

warning alerting kernel of the AILS alerting system. The one dot and two dot deviation alerts present a simple scenario and can be easily added to our model by a separate function as it is done in the current implementation.

3. The AILS Alerting Algorithm. The alerting algorithm determines when an alarm will be triggered by calculating possible collision trajectories and comparing the future aircraft locations with predetermined time and distance thresholds. The algorithm is executed in two modes every `tstep` seconds: (1) the first mode assumes its own aircraft is a threat to the adjacent aircraft and the adjacent aircraft is following the localizer; (2) the second mode assumes the adjacent aircraft is a threat to its own and the own is following the localizer. In either mode, one aircraft is the intruder and one is the evader.

When the intruder aircraft is not changing direction, i.e., its bank angle is 0, the algorithm determines if the two aircraft are diverging or converging and the point of closest separation. This is done by obtaining the derivative of the distance between the aircraft and solving for time when the derivative equals zero as follows.

$$(3.1) \quad \Delta_x(t) = x_{in}(t) - x_{ev}(t)$$

$$(3.2) \quad \Delta_y(t) = y_{in}(t) - y_{ev}(t)$$

$$(3.3) \quad \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_x(t) = \text{intruderSpeed} \times \cos(\theta) - \text{evaderSpeed}$$

$$(3.4) \quad \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_y(t) = \text{intruderSpeed} \times \sin(\theta)$$

$$(3.5) \quad R(t) = \sqrt{\Delta_x(t)^2 + \Delta_y(t)^2}$$

$$(3.6) \quad \frac{d}{dt} R(t) = \frac{\Delta_x(t) \times \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_x(t) + \Delta_y(t) \times \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_y(t)}{\sqrt{R(t)}}$$

For a time t , $(x_{in}(t), y_{in}(t))$ and $(x_{ev}(t), y_{ev}(t))$ are the coordinates of the intruder and evader aircraft, respectively, and θ is the heading angle of the intruder aircraft. When $\frac{d}{dt} R(t + \tau) = 0$, we get the time τ , relative to t , of the point of closest separation of the aircraft. Time τ has been calculated as

$$(3.7) \quad \tau(t) = - \frac{\Delta_x(t) \times \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_x(t) + \Delta_y(t) \times \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_y(t)}{\frac{d}{dt} \Delta_x(t)^2 + \frac{d}{dt} \Delta_y(t)^2}$$




FIG. 3.1. Converging tracks




FIG. 3.2. Radial trajectory and tangential tracks

Equations 3.1 to 3.7 were formally deduced, from initial physical properties, by using the computer algebra tool MuPAD [4]. Notice that τ is undetermined when the aircraft are parallel and the ground speeds are equal. In this case, the alerting algorithm defines $\tau(t) = 0$ for any t .

For a time t , if $\tau(t)$ is negative or zero, the tracks are diverging or parallel, respectively. If $\tau(t)$ is greater than zero, the tracks are converging and $\tau(t)$ will be the time of closest separation (Figure 3.1). When tracks are diverging or parallel, the algorithm checks the aircraft separation at the present time against the alert threshold distances (*cdist* and *wdist* in Figure 2.1). When tracks are converging, the algorithm compares the time and distance of closest separation against time and distance thresholds, respectively.

When the intruder aircraft is changing direction, i.e., its bank angle is not 0, the algorithm calculates the radius of the turn and the rate of change of direction. Tangential tracks are calculated from the arc path as to produce tangents which are 1.5° to 3° in angular separation (Figure 3.2). For each of these tangential tracks the algorithm determines whether the two aircraft tracks are diverging or converging and performs time and distance comparisons as explained above.

The original AILS algorithm was written in FORTRAN at Langley Research Center. It has been revised several times and the latest version flown in the Boeing 757 experimental aircraft was provided by Honeywell.

For the work presented in this paper, we created a high level abstract model of the alerting algorithm in the PVS language. The algorithm model uses the same strategy as the FORTRAN algorithm to determine if alarms are triggered, as explained above. All of the PVS declarations involved in the modeling of the algorithm can be seen in the theory file available at <http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/people/vac/ails.pvs>.

The model of the algorithm is a function which takes the states of the aircraft and returns a boolean

value corresponding to whether the alarm is triggered or not. The type of the alarm, caution or warning, depends on the threshold parameters. The state of the aircraft is defined by a record:

```
state : TYPE =
  [# x      : real,
   y      : real,
   heading : [-180...180]
   phi    : [-45...45]
  #]
```

We recall that access to records are written in PVS as function calls, i.e., if s is a state, $x(s)$ refers to the field x of the state s . Thus, $x(s)$ and $y(s)$ are the position coordinates, $heading(s)$ is the angle between the flight path and the localizer track which range between -180° and 180° , and $phi(s)$ is the aircraft bank angle between -45° and 45° .

The model of the alerting algorithm is given next.

```
larcalert(evader,intruder:state): bool =
  LET phi = phi(intruder) IN
  LET trkrate =  $g \times (180/\pi) \times \tan(\phi) / \text{intruderSpeed}$  IN
  IF trkrate = 0 THEN                                % Direction is not changing.
    chktrack(0)                                       % Check strait tracks.
  ELSE                                                % Direction is changing
    LET arcrad =                                     % Calculate arc radius.
       $\text{intruderSpeed}^2 / (g \times \tan(\phi))$  IN
    LET maxstep = alert_time/tstep IN
    LET idtrk =
      IF  $\text{abs}(\text{trkrate}) \geq 3$  THEN 1                % This determines
      ELSIF  $\text{abs}(\text{trkrate}) \geq 1+1/2$  THEN 2          % how often
      ELSIF  $\text{abs}(\text{trkrate}) \geq 3/4$  THEN 4            % tangential
      ELSE 8                                           % tracks are
      ENDIF IN                                         % calculated.
    arc_loop(evader,intruder,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,0,maxstep)
  ENDIF
```

where g is the gravitational acceleration constant (approx. $32.2 \text{ feet/seconds}^2$).

The first part of the function is exercised when the track rate (trkrate) is zero and there is no change in the intruder's heading. The chktrack function is used to determine if an alarm will be triggered. The function chktrack makes the calculation for converging or diverging tracks, according to Equations 3.1 to 3.7. If the tracks are diverging, the function chkrange is called to compare present locations against time and distance threshold (ctime and cdist , respectively). If the tracks are converging, predicted locations at caution time or time of closest separation, whatever is smaller, are compared. The structure of the definitions of chkrange and chktrack are given next.

```
chkrange(range,t:real): bool =
  range  $\leq$   $\text{cdist} \wedge t \leq \text{ctime}$ 
```

```
chktrack(t:real): bool =
  LET range =  $R(t)$  IN
```

```

LET tau =  $\tau(t)$  IN
IF tau  $\leq$  0 THEN          % Tracks are diverging (or parallel).
    chkrange(range,t)      % Check range at prediction time t.
ELSE
    % Tracks are converging.
    IF t+tau > ctime THEN  % Closest separation beyond caution alert time.
        R(ctime)  $\leq$  cdist % Check range at caution threshold.
    ELSE
        % Closest separation within caution alert time.
        R(t+tau)  $\leq$  cdist % Check range at time of closest separation.
    ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF

```

The second part of the function `larcalert` handles the case when intruder is changing direction. The arc radius is calculated and the function `arc_loop` generates the tangential tracks from the arc trajectory. The function `arc_loop` is a recursive function modeling a DO-LOOP statement. It is used to iterate the function `chktrack` on tangential tracks every `idtrk` time steps. Its actual definition is too long to be included in the paper and can also be seen in the theory file as pointed above. The structure of the function is:

```

arc_loop(evader,intruder,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,iarc,maxstep): RECURSIVE bool =
    calculate positions of aircraft
    IF not time for a tangential track THEN
        IF chkrange(...) THEN % Check range at that point.
            TRUE               % Trigger an alarm.
        ELSE
            arc_loop(...)      % Go to new iteration.
        ENDIF
    ELSE
        % Time for tangential tracks.
        IF chktrk(...) THEN % Check track at this point.
            TRUE             % Trigger an alarm.
        ELSE
            arc_loop(...)    % Go to new iteration.
        ENDIF
    ENDIF

```

Based on the `idtrk` argument and the step in the loop `iarc`, the function `arc_loop` determines if a tangential track is calculated or not. If a tangential track is not calculated, the function `chkrange` compares the distance between the calculated positions of the aircraft and the distance threshold. The function `chktrk` is used to check for collisions on all the tangential tracks in the loop. The function `arc_loop` terminates when one of the functions `chkrange` or `chktrack` triggers an alarm or when `iarc` has reached `maxstep`.

In the PVS model, we are using an axiomatic definition of the square root function (`sqrt`, see Section 5). Trigonometric functions (`sind`, `cosd`, and `tand`, for sine, cosine, and tangent of angles in degrees, respectively) are defined by series approximations. However, as we will see in Section 5, we also provide axioms about trigonometric functions to facilitate the proofs.

As we have seen, the AILS algorithm considers a limited set of possible trajectories for the intruder aircraft, i.e., assuming a constant radius turn at the original bank angle, only tangent track escapes to the turn arc are considered. The developers of the algorithm state that this assumption is reasonable under normal circumstances, i.e., the intruder aircraft is not intentionally trying to collide with the evader aircraft. However, to evaluate the behavior of the algorithm in a wider range of possible landing scenarios, a more

general model of trajectories for the intruder aircraft is necessary. In the next section, we develop such a model.

4. Parallel Landing Scenarios. According to the characteristics and assumptions of the AILS algorithm, we propose a time-discrete model with time increments of `tstep` seconds.

In our model of trajectories, as in the case of the alerting algorithm, intrusion paths are determined by the bank angle and ground speed of the intruder aircraft. Given a ground speed $gs > 0$, a bank angle ϕ , the heading turn rate is given by

$$\text{trkrate}(gs, \phi) = \frac{\tan(\phi) \times g \times 180}{gs \times \pi},$$

where g is the gravitational acceleration constant.

Although under normal operation the bank angle of a commercial aircraft is limited to -30° to 30° , we allow the bank angle to range from -45° to 45° . For a minimum ground speed of 180 feet per second, it means a maximum heading turn rate of about 6° per second. These data produce very aggressive blundering situations quite consistent with worst cases scenarios tested by the AILS developing group. Incidentally, the function `trkrate` is well-defined for bank angles in the range $[-45 \dots 45]$.

DEFINITION 4.1 (Intruder trajectory). *An intruder trajectory of length n for an aircraft with state s and ground speed gs is a sequence of states $s_0 \dots s_n$ such that $s_0 = s$ and for $0 < i \leq n$,*

1. $|\phi(s_i)| \leq 45$,
2. $|\text{heading}(s_i) - \text{heading}(s_{i-1})| = \text{tstep} \times \text{trkrate}(gs, \phi(s_i))$,
3. $x(s_i) = x(s_{i-1}) + gs \times \text{tstep} \times \cos(\text{heading}(s_i))$, and
4. $y(s_i) = y(s_{i-1}) + gs \times \text{tstep} \times \sin(\text{heading}(s_i))$.

In PVS, we define the next state of an intruder aircraft at state s and bank angle ϕ by the function

```
next_intruder_state(s:state, phi:[-45...45]): state =
  LET trk = heading(s) + tstep*trkrate(intruderSpeed, phi(s)) IN
  s WITH [
    x      := x(s) + intruderSpeed*tstep*cosd(trk),
    y      := y(s) + intruderSpeed*tstep*sind(trk),
    heading := trk,
    phi    := phi
  ]
```

We recall that `WITH` is the record (and function) overriding operator in PVS.

We model an intruder trajectory by a recursive function having as parameters an initial state s , a bank angle assignment for each iteration step df , and the iteration step n , as follows

```
intruder_trajectory(s:state, df:[posnat→[-45...45]], n:nat):
  RECURSIVE state =
    IF n = 0 THEN s
    ELSE
      LET sn = next_intruder_state(s, df(n)) IN
      intruder_trajectory(sn, df, n-1)
    ENDIF
  MEASURE n
```


For example, given an intruder aircraft at initial state s and bank angle equal to 0, a trajectory of length n such that the plane follows a straight line to its current heading angle is given by $s_0 \dots s_n$, where $s_0 = s$ and for $0 < i \leq n$,

$$s_i = \text{intruder_trajectory}(s, \lambda(n : \text{posnat}) : 0, i).$$

For the evader aircraft, we assume that it stays in its localizer with a constant speed and constant heading of 0° . Heading and bank angles are irrelevant in the definition of an evader trajectory.

DEFINITION 4.2 (Evader trajectory). *An evader trajectory of length n for an aircraft with state s and ground speed gs is a sequence of states $s_0 \dots s_n$ such that $s_0 = s$ and for $0 < i \leq n$,*

1. $x(s_i) = x(s_{i-1}) + gs \times tstep$ and
2. $y(s_i) = y(s_0)$.

For an initial state s of an aircraft, its state after n steps in a evader trajectory is defined by $\text{evader_trajectory}(s, n)$ as follows

```
evader_trajectory(s:state, n:nat): state =
  (#
    x      := x(s) + evaderSpeed×tstep×n,
    y      := y(s),
    heading := heading(s),
    phi    := phi(s)
  #)
```

We are interested in trajectories leading to collision incidents. Aircraft are said to be in *collision* if the distance between them is less than or equal to `collisionRange`. In our development, we consider 200 feet for `collisionRange`, which is approximately the wing span of a Boeing 747.

```
distance(s1,s2:state): real =
  sqrt((x(s2)-x(s1))2 + (y(s2)-y(s1))2)
```

```
collision(s1,s2:state): bool =
  distance(s1,s2) ≤ collisionRange
```

DEFINITION 4.3 (Collision scenario). *Given an intruder trajectory $s_0 \dots s_n$ and an an evader trajectory $t_0 \dots t_n$, we said that they lead to a collision incident at step i , for $0 \leq i \leq n$, if $\text{collision}(s_i, t_i)$ holds.*

In PVS,

```
collision_scenario(intruder,evader:state, df:[posnat→[-45...45]],
  i:nat):bool =
  collision(intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i),
    evader_trajectory(evader,i))
```

We have implemented the model of trajectories, together with our high-level version of the alerting algorithm, in Java. The implementation, available in the same location as the PVS theory files, serves a double purpose. First, it allows us to visualize all the collision trajectories for a given time and initial values of the intruder and evader aircraft. Second and more importantly, by studying those trajectories, we were able to extract conjectures that we have then formally proven in PVS. Conversely, as we will mention later, we have rejected some conjectures by finding counter-examples via simulation of collision trajectories,

In the next section, we address the formal verification of properties of collision trajectories for our model in PVS, and we study the behavior of the alerting algorithm with respect to that model.

5. Main Properties. The objective of this modeling and verification work is (i) to show that the method implemented in the algorithm to predict trajectories and trigger alarms is adequate and does not lead to dangerous situations, or (ii) to explore possible trajectory scenarios which lead to unacceptable risk. To this effect we created models of the algorithm and aircraft trajectories in PVS, created simulations in JAVA to visualize the behavior and characteristics of the landing scenario, and verified in the computer algebra tool MuPAD some axiomatic definitions we made in PVS.

Before stating the main properties, it should be said that most of the proofs require reasoning on continuous mathematics. We have assumed some uninterpreted functions and axioms in PVS, for instance

`sqrt(x:real) : {z:real | z2 = x and z ≥ 0}`

`sin_cos_sq_one : AXIOM`

`∀ (x:real): sind(x)2 + cosd(x)2 = 1`

More involved properties, grounded on Equations 3.1 to 3.7, are also necessary, e.g.,

`derivative_eq_zero_min : AXIOM`

`∀ (t1,t2:real): R(t1+τ(t1)) ≤ R(t1+t2)`

`asymptotic_decrease_zero_to_tau : AXIOM`

`∀ (t,t1,t2:real) :`

`τ(t) ≥ 0 ∧ t2 ≤ τ(t) ∧ t1 ≤ t2`

`⇒`

`R(t+t1) ≥ R(t+t2)`

`asymptotic_increase_tau_to_zero : AXIOM`

`∀ (t,t1,t2:real) :`

`τ(t) ≤ 0 ∧ t2 ≥ τ(t) ∧ t1 ≥ t2`

`⇒`

`R(t+t1) ≥ R(t+t2)`

Axiom `derivative_eq_zero_min` states that at time t , $\tau(t)$ would be the time of closest separation between the aircraft. Axioms `asymptotic_decrease_zero_to_tau` and `asymptotic_increase_tau_to_zero` state that function R asymptotically decreases for times less than $\tau(t)$ and asymptotically increases for times greater than $\tau(t)$, respectively. As we have mentioned before, the equations of Section 3 have been symbolically deduced in MuPAD.

Our intention is to show that for all aircraft trajectories which lead to a collision and all initial states¹, an alarm is issued i seconds before a collision. In our formal development, we have found upper and lower bounds for the values of i .

One of the first properties that we have proven is that an alarm (caution or warning) is triggered when the distance between the aircraft is within the alerting range (`cdist` or `wdist`, respectively). This property holds independently of the values of any other state variables of the aircraft.

¹Recall from Section 2 that initial states are when the aircraft are on their localizers.

alarm_when_alerting_distance : THEOREM

\forall (evader,intruder:state) :
 alerting_distance(evader,intruder) \Rightarrow larcalert(evader,intruder)

The theorem above puts the greatest lower bound on the elapsed time between an alert and a collision that we have found so far. For an alerting distance of 1400 feet and an intruder ground speed of 250 feet per second this results in an alarm at least 4 seconds before collision.

An effort to prove that a caution is issued for a value of (ctime-1) (ctime being defined as 19 seconds) resulted in an unprovable conjecture. Indeed, we have found a counter example of a collision trajectory which allows two aircraft to fly to a distance of less than 1300 feet, without triggering an alarm 11 seconds before the collision.

move_2500_to_1300_no_alarm_before_11_seconds : THEOREM

\exists (intruder,evader:state, df:[posnat \rightarrow [-45...45]], n:nat) :
 collision_scenario(intruder,evader,df,n+11/tstep) \wedge
 distance(intruder,evader) = 2500 \wedge
 distance(intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,n),
 evader_trajectory(evader,n)) < 1300 \wedge
 \forall (i:[0...n]):
 \neg larcalert(evader_trajectory(evader,i),
 intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i))

By combining these theorems, we can state that for some trajectories an alarm will sound no more than 11 seconds before collision and that for all cases an alarm will sound at least 4 seconds before a collision. We believe that for all cases the greatest-lower bound time when the alarm will sound prior to a collision is closer to 11 than to 4. In order to reveal that bound, we need to find strong invariants on collision trajectories. Notice, for example, that for an intruder trajectory $s_0 \dots s_n$ and an evader trajectory $t_0 \dots t_n$, it cannot be the case that they lead to a collision incident at step n when $\text{distance}(s_0, t_n) > R$, where

$$R = \text{collisionRange} + \text{intruderSpeed} \times n \times \text{tstep}.$$

Indeed, any intruder aircraft out of the circle of center $(x(t_n), y(t_n))$ and radius R , needs a larger time than $n \times \text{tstep}$ to reach any point of the circle of center $(x(t_n), y(t_n))$ and radio collisionRange. The property above can be expressed in PVS as follows.

collision_invariant : LEMMA

\forall (intruder,evader:state, df:[posnat \rightarrow [-45...45]], n:nat) :
 collision_scenario(intruder,evader,df,n)
 \Rightarrow
 \forall (i:[0...n]):
 distance(intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i),
 evader_trajectory(evader,n)) \leq
 collisionRange+intruderSpeed \times (n-i) \times tstep

The proof of this invariant requires the following lemmas.

straight_line_farthest: LEMMA

\forall (intruder:state,df:[posnat \rightarrow [-45...45]],n:nat) :
 LET straight_trajectory = λ (n:posnat):0 IN

```

distance(intruder,
         intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,n)) ≤
distance(intruder,
         intruder_trajectory(intruder,straight_trajectory,n))

absolute_distance: LEMMA
  ∀ (intruder:state,n:nat) :
    phi(intruder)=0
    ⇒
    LET straight_trajectory = λ(n:posnat):0 IN
    distance(intruder,
             intruder_trajectory(intruder,straight_trajectory,n))
    = intruderSpeed×n×tstep

```

Lemma `straight_line_farthest` states that an intruder trajectory following a straight line reaches a point farthest than any other trajectory, while Lemma `absolute_distance` states that the length of an intruder trajectory following a straight line is the same as `intruderSpeed×n×tstep`.

We intend to use the above invariant and lemmas, together with properties derived from the physical trajectories, to find a bound greater than 4 seconds for any collision scenario. Under particular assumptions of the intruder bank angle (given by the function `df`), we have proven that there exists a point outside of the alerting threshold range where the alarm is issued. The conjecture is expressed in PVS as follows

```

bound : CONJECTURE
  ∀ (intruder,evader:state, df:[posnat→[-45...45]], n:nat) :
    collision_scenario(intruder,evader,df,n)
    ⇒
    ∃(i:[0...n]) :
      ¬ alerting_distance(evader_trajectory(evader,i),
                          intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i)) ∧
      larcalert(evader_trajectory(evader,i),
                intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i))

```

We are trying to generalize the proof for an arbitrary value of `df`. If the attempt is successful, it gives a new greatest lower bound of 5 seconds.

6. Conclusion. Several case studies have been performed on the application of hybrid automata to the modeling of systems which include continuous and discrete domains. In particular, a simplified TCAS system was modeled in [9] using hybrid automata. That work focuses on establishing a hybrid model of the closed loop system formed by several aircrafts flying under TCAS assumptions. Although it is claimed that the model is suitable for formal analysis, there is no explicit attempt to automate the proof process. On the other hand, state exploration techniques have been used to analyze the system requirements specification of TCAS II written in RSML [7]; we refer for instance to [5, 2]. These works focus on the reactive aspect of the whole system.

In the work presented in this paper, we constructed a formal model of the kernel of an alerting algorithm and we studied its behavior with respect to a model of collision trajectories. In our analysis, we assumed that the alerting algorithm runs in isolation of the other components of the system. We defer the integration of the alerting algorithm with rest of the system, for example TCAS, for future research.

An abstract model of the algorithm and its properties were developed in the general verification system

PVS. We complemented the prover capabilities with computer algebra tools. Indeed, differential equations, resulting from physical phenomena, were mechanically verified in MuPAD. Models of the algorithm and collision trajectories were implemented in Java. The implementation allowed us to explore collision scenarios before performing rigorous attempts to prove properties.

Although we have confidence in the conjectures that have been declared as axioms, work is being performed [10] in the development of a PVS library on transcendental functions which complements a previous work on mathematical analysis in PVS [1]. Hence, it might be possible in the near future to replace the axiomatic definitions with theorems.

Lower and upper bounds for a time when an alarm will be issued before a collision were found. Our immediate goal, in the verification of the AILS algorithm, is to prove certain facts about the characteristics of the aircraft trajectories. We hope that these facts allow us to prove the adequacy of the alerting algorithm for a time large enough to avoid any possible collision incident.

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Appendix. The AILS Alerting Algorithm in PVS.

```
%-----
% AILS Alerting Algorithm in PVS
%   Victor Carreno (v.a.carreno@larc.nasa.gov)
%   Cesar Munoz (munoz@icase.edu)
%   ICASE - NASA Langley Research Center
% This model is an abstraction of the algorithm written by
%   Bill Capron
%   NASA Langley Research Center
% and described by
%   Mike Jackson
%   Honeywell Technology Center
% Assumptions
% * Coordinate system:
%   +-->x   --> landing direction
%   |
%   v
%   y
% * Two dimensional
% * Ground speed is constant
%-----

AILS : THEORY
BEGIN

%-- Types

Bank      : TYPE = subrange(-45,45)
deg_heading : TYPE = subrange(-180,180)

State: type =
  [# x      : real,
   y        : real,
   heading   : deg_heading,
```

```

        phi      : Bank
    #]

%-- Constants

collisionRange : real = 200
alertTime      : real = 19
alertRange     : real = 1000
intruderSpeed  : real = 250
evaderSpeed    : real = 250
tstep         : real = 1/2
divtstep(x:real) : real = x*2
maxStep        : real = 1 + divtstep(alertTime)
g              : real = 32+2/10

%-- Variables

intruder,
evader      : VAR State
df          : VAR [posnat->Bank]
phi         : VAR Bank
s,s1,s2     : VAR State
x,range     : VAR real
t,t1,t2     : VAR real
n           : VAR nat
m           : VAR posnat
iarc        : VAR subrange(0,maxStep)
arcrad,trkrate: VAR real
idtrk       : VAR posnat

%-- Useful functions

pi : real = 3141592/1000000

cosd(x): real
= LET r = x*pi/180 IN
  1 - expt(r,2)/2 + expt(r,4)/24 - expt(r,6)/720 + expt(r,8)/40320

sind(x) : real
= LET r = x*pi/180 IN
  r - expt(r,3)/6 + expt(r,5)/120 - expt(r,7)/5040 + expt(r,9)/362880

tangent_well_defined : AXIOM

```

```

FORALL (phi) : cosd(phi) /= 0

tand(phi): real =
  sind(phi)/cosd(phi)

mod(n,m): RECURSIVE nat =
  IF n < m THEN n
  ELSE mod(n-m,m)
  ENDIF
MEASURE n

sq(x): nonneg_real = x*x

sqrt_well_defined : AXIOM
  FORALL (x:nonneg_real):
    nonempty?({z:nonneg_real | z*z = x})

sqrt(x:nonneg_real) : {z:nonneg_real | z*z = x}

distance(s1,s2): real =
  sqrt(sq(x(s2)-x(s1)) + sq(y(s2)-y(s1)))

collision(s1,s2): bool =
  distance(s1,s2) <= collisionRange

alerting_distance(s1,s2): bool =
  distance(s1,s2) <= alertRange

trkrate(phi): real =
  IF phi = 0 then 0
  ELSE 1845*tand(phi)/intruderSpeed
  ENDIF

dx(intruder,evader,t): real =
  (x(intruder) + t*intruderSpeed*cosd(heading(intruder))) -
  (x(evader) + t*evaderSpeed)

dy(intruder,evader,t): real =
  (y(intruder) + t*intruderSpeed*sind(heading(intruder))) -
  y(evader)

dxdt(intruder): real =
  intruderSpeed*cosd(heading(intruder)) - evaderSpeed

```



```

dydt(intruder): real =
    intruderSpeed*sind(heading(intruder))

R(intruder,evader,t): real =
    sqrt(sq(dx(intruder,evader,t)) + sq(dy(intruder,evader,t)))

tau(intruder,evader,t):real =
    LET div = sq(dxdt(intruder)) + sq(dydt(intruder)) IN
    IF div = 0 THEN 0
    ELSE
        -(dx(intruder,evader,t) * dxdt(intruder) +
            dy(intruder,evader,t) * dydt(intruder))/div
    ENDIF

%-- Alerting algorithm

chkrange(range,t): bool =
    range <= alertRange AND t <= alertTime

chktrack(intruder,evader,t): bool =
    LET tau = tau(intruder,evader,0) IN
    IF tau <= 0 THEN                                % tracks are diverging (or parallel)
        chkrange(R(intruder,evader,0),t) % check range at prediction time t
    ELSIF t+tau > alertTime THEN                    % tracks are converging
        R(intruder,evader,alertTime) % closest approach beyond alert time
        <= alertRange % check range at alert threshold
    ELSE % closest approach within alert time.
        R(intruder,evader,tau) % check range at closest approach.
        <= alertRange
    ENDIF

arc_loop(intruder,evader,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,iarc): RECURSIVE bool =
    IF iarc = maxStep THEN false
    ELSE
        LET tpred = iarc*tstep IN
        LET xloc = x(evader) + evaderSpeed*tpred IN
        LET yloc = y(evader) + evaderSpeed*tpred IN
        %% There are two cases trkrate > 0 or trkrate < 0
        LET (xtrk,ytrk) =
            IF trkrate > 0 THEN
                (x(intruder) + arcrad*(sind(heading(intruder))+trkrate*tpred) -
                    sind(heading(intruder))),

```

```

        y(intruder) + arcrad*(cosd(heading(intruder))-
            cosd(heading(intruder)+trkrate*tpred)))
    ELSE
        (x(intruder) + arcrad*(sind(heading(intruder)) -
            sind(heading(intruder))+trkrate*tpred),
        y(intruder) + arcrad*(cosd(heading(intruder)+trkrate*tpred)-
            cosd(heading(intruder))))
    ENDIF IN
IF NOT mod(iarc,idtrk) = 0 THEN      % not time for tangential track
    LET range = sqrt(sq(xtrk-xloc) + sq(ytrk-yloc)) IN
    IF chkrange(range,tpred) THEN true
    ELSE arc_loop(intruder,evader,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,iarc+1)
    ENDIF
ELSE % tangential track
    LET tantrk = heading(intruder) + tpred*trkrate IN
    LET int = intruder WITH [x:=xtrk, y:=ytrk, heading:=tantrk] IN
    LET eva = evader WITH [x:=xloc, y:=yloc] IN
    IF chktrack(int,eva,tpred) THEN true
    ELSE arc_loop(intruder,evader,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,iarc+1)
    ENDIF
ENDIF
MEASURE (maxStep - iarc)

larcalert(intruder,evader): bool =
    LET phi = phi(intruder) IN
    LET trkrate = trkrate(phi) IN
    IF trkrate = 0 THEN
        chktrack(intruder,evader,0)
    ELSE
        LET arcrad = sq(intruderSpeed)/(g*tand(phi)) IN
        LET idtrk =
            IF trkrate >= 3 THEN 1
            ELSIF trkrate >= 1 + 1/2 THEN 2
            ELSIF trkrate >= 3/4 THEN 4
            ELSE 8
            ENDIF IN
        arc_loop(intruder,evader,arcrad,trkrate,idtrk,0)
    ENDIF

%-- Model of trajectories

next_intruder_state(s,phi): State =

```

```

LET trk = heading(s) + tstep*trkrate(phi(s)) IN
  s WITH [
    x      := x(s) + intruderSpeed*tstep*cosd(heading(s)),
    y      := y(s) + intruderSpeed*tstep*sind(heading(s)),
    heading := trk,
    phi    := phi
  ]

intruder_trajectory(s,df,n): RECURSIVE State =
  IF n = 0 THEN s
  ELSE
    next_intruder_state(intruder_trajectory(s, df, n-1),df(n))
  ENDIF
  MEASURE n

evader_trajectory(s,n): State =
  (#
    x      := x(s) + evaderSpeed * tstep * n,
    y      := y(s),
    heading := heading(s),
    phi    := phi(s)
  #)

collision_scenario(intruder,evader,df,n): bool =
  collision(intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,n),
    evader_trajectory(evader,n))

%-- Axioms

sin_cos_sq_one : AXIOM
  FORALL (x):
    sq(sind(x)) + sq(cosd(x)) = 1

derivative_eq_zero_min : AXIOM
  FORALL (intruder,t1,t2):
    R(intruder,evader,t1+tau(intruder,evader,t1)) <=
    R(intruder,evader,t1+t2)

asymptotic_decrease_zero_to_tau : AXIOM
  FORALL (t,t1,t2:real) :
    tau(intruder,evader,t) >= 0 AND t2 <= tau(intruder,evader,t) AND
    t1 <= t2
  IMPLIES

```

```

R(intruder, evader, t+t1) >= R(intruder, evader, t+t2)

asymptotic_increase_tau_to_zero : AXIOM
FORALL (t, t1, t2: real) :
  tau(intruder, evader, t) <= 0 AND tau(intruder, evader, t) <= t1 AND
  t1 <= t2
  IMPLIES
  R(intruder, evader, t+t2) >= R(intruder, evader, t+t1)

%-- Theorems and Properties

sqrt_of_sq: theorem
  (sqrt(sq(x))) = abs(x)

phi_not_0_tan_not_0 : theorem
  NOT phi = 0 implies not tand(phi) = 0

alarm_at_alerting_distance : THEOREM
FORALL (evader, intruder) :
  alerting_distance(evader, intruder)
  IMPLIES
  larcalert(intruder, evader)

move_2500_to_1300_no_alarm_before_11_seconds : THEOREM
EXISTS (intruder, evader, df, n) :
  collision_scenario(intruder, evader, df, n+divtstep(11)) AND
  distance(intruder, evader) = 2500 AND
  distance(intruder_trajectory(intruder, df, n),
    evader_trajectory(evader, n)) <= 1300 AND
FORALL (i: subrange(0, n)) :
  NOT larcalert(intruder_trajectory(intruder, df, i),
    evader_trajectory(evader, i))

collision_invariant : LEMMA
FORALL (intruder, evader, df, n) :
  collision_scenario(intruder, evader, df, n)
  IMPLIES
FORALL (i: subrange(0, n)):
  distance(intruder_trajectory(intruder, df, i),
    evader_trajectory(evader, n)) <=
  collisionRange+intruderSpeed*(n-i)*tstep

straight_line_farthest: LEMMA

```

```

FORALL (intruder,evader,df,n) :
  LET straight_trajectory = LAMBDA(n:posnat):0 IN
  distance(intruder,
    intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,n)) <=
  distance(intruder,
    intruder_trajectory(intruder,straight_trajectory,n))

absolute_distance: LEMMA
FORALL (intruder,n) :
  phi(intruder)=0
  IMPLIES
  LET straight_trajectory = LAMBDA(n:posnat):0 IN
  distance(intruder,
    intruder_trajectory(intruder,straight_trajectory,n))
  = intruderSpeed*n*ttstep

bound : CONJECTURE
FORALL (intruder,evader,df,n) :
  collision_scenario(intruder,evader,df,n)
  IMPLIES
  EXISTS(i:subrange(0,n)) :
    NOT alerting_distance(evader_trajectory(evader,i),
      intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i)) AND
    larcalert(intruder_trajectory(intruder,df,i),
      evader_trajectory(evader,i))

END AILS

```